

Revisiting the secrets of BEFORE: lessons from Modern Greek*

Orest Xherija

Department of Linguistics, The University of Chicago, Chicago IL 60637, U.S.A.
orest.xherija@uchicago.edu

Abstract. I consider two analyses of the semantics of BEFORE-clauses (**BCs**) in light of two phenomena in Modern Greek (**MG**): licensing of strong Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) and an anti-PAST restriction on the verb in the **BC**. I show that [2] and [11] cannot be extended to **MG** (at least without significant modifications) and that a new approach is necessary. This paper proposes a disjunctive semantics for BEFORE that makes **BCs** non-committal by default (that is, there is no commitment about the instantiation of the event described by the **BC**) and makes the factual and non-factual inferences contextual entailments. The disjunctive semantics makes BEFORE a NONVERIDICAL environment which explains the licensing of weak NPIs in **BCs** and the emergence of the PERFECTIVE NON-PAST (PNP) as the tense-aspect combination of the verb of **BCs**. The licensing of strong NPIs is achieved through a rescuing mechanism similar to that of [6].

1 Introduction

It is a well-attested fact of English that BEFORE-clauses (**BCs**) can yield a factual [1], a non-factual [2] and a non-committal [3] inference about the instantiation of the eventuality they describe.

1. Dreyfus ate the salad BEFORE he had dessert.
 \Rightarrow Dreyfus had dessert. (factual)
2. The MI6 defused the bomb BEFORE it exploded.
 \Rightarrow The bomb did **not** explode. (non-factual)
3. Dreyfus left the country BEFORE anything **ever** happened.
 \nRightarrow Something did (not) happen. (non-committal)

A natural question is whether, crosslinguistically, words whose meaning is akin to that of English BEFORE, namely words which (at least in an intuitive sense) are used to talk about temporal precedence, exhibit similar semantic behavior. It turns out that these patterns are crosslinguistically robust and can

* I am grateful to Anastasia Giannakidou, Itamar Francez, Alda Mari, Chris Kennedy, Cleo Condoravdi, Yael Sharvit and Henriëtte de Swart for valuable comments and suggestions. Naturally, the aforementioned individuals do not necessarily agree with the views of this paper and the responsibility for all errors remains solely with me.

be observed in a number of languages, including Italian [3], German [12,15], Catalan [13], Russian [15] and Japanese [10,9, *inter alia*]. The following examples, which are direct translations of [1] - [3] in Modern Greek (**MG**), show that the English inference pattern is observed in this language, too:

4. O Dreyfus éfaye ti saláta PRIN fái to ylikó.
 \Rightarrow O Dreyfus éfaye to ylikó. (factual)
5. I MI6 apeneryopíse ti vómva PRIN ekrayí.
 \Rightarrow I vómva **ðen** ekseráyi. (non-factual)
6. O Dreyfus éfiye apó ti chóra PRIN simví **poté** típota.
 \nRightarrow Káti (ðen) sinévi. (non-committal)

A second robust crosslinguistic fact is that BEFORE licenses weak Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) in the **BC**, as the presence of *ever* in the **BC** of [3] and of *poté* 'ever' in the **BC** of [6] exemplify. In this paper, I want to consider two phenomena from **MG BCs** that, to the best of my knowledge, have not been addressed in the literature and their study might shed light to some intricacies in the meaning of **BCs**.

- **MG BCs** sporadically allow strong NPIs à la [18], that is NPIs that need to be in the scope of an at least ANTIADDITIVE operator, as exemplified by the presence of focused *kanéna* in the **BC** of [7]; and
- they forbid PAST tense marking on their verb and only allow it to surface in the PERFECTIVE NON-PAST (PNP) form [8], a tense-aspect combination that is only sanctioned in NONVERIDICAL contexts¹ in **MG**, as argued in [7]. This does not hold true for other **MG** temporal connectives as can be seen in² [8], where AFTER- and WHEN-clauses do not forbid PAST tense marking on the verb.

7. O Iordánis péthane PRIN ði / *íðe **kanéna**_F egóni tu.
the Jordan died BEFORE see.PNP / saw **nobody** grandchild his
‘Jordan died before seeing **any at all** of his grandchildren.’
8. I Féðra éfiye ÓTAN/AFÚ *ftási / éftase i Natasa.
the Phaedra left WHEN/AFTER arrive.PNP / arrived the Natasha
‘Phaedra left when/after Natasha arrived.’

This paper aims to address three questions: (a) How do the inferences in [1] – [3] arise and what is their truth-conditional status? (b) How is the PNP verbal form in **MG** related to the potential (non)veridicality of BEFORE? and (c) How does the licensing of (strong) NPIs take place in **MG BCs**?

¹ An operator \mathcal{F} is NONVERIDICAL if for all propositions p , $\mathcal{F}(p) \nRightarrow p$.

² Some **MG** temporal connectives are followed by certain particles that impose their own selectional restrictions on the verb. I do not address this class of temporal connectives in this paper.

3 Proposal

I restrict my attention to BEFORE when it conjoins two untensed clauses; I ignore BEFORE with a nominal complement. I take it, following [14, among others], that verbs require a time-interval argument of the form $[a, b]$, $a \prec b$. The type of time intervals will be i and therefore the type of temporal properties will be $\langle i, t \rangle$. I do not take any position regarding the properties of the denotation of verbs depending on their *Aktionsart* class, but the reader can consult [2] for a possible set of assumptions. We assume, with [2], that the untensed clause $[\mathcal{A} \text{ BEFORE } \mathcal{B}]$ composes intersectively, i.e. $\llbracket \mathcal{A} \text{ BEFORE } \mathcal{B} \rrbracket = \llbracket \mathcal{A} \rrbracket \wedge \llbracket \text{BEFORE } \mathcal{B} \rrbracket$. Finally, we denote by “ \prec ” the relation of temporal precedence and by “inf” the greatest lower bound of a non-empty set of \mathbb{R} , with the additional premise that there exists an isomorphism between \mathbb{R} and the set of moments of time \mathcal{T} . With this background, we propose the denotation for BEFORE in [B0], where \vee is exclusive disjunction:

$$\llbracket \text{BEFORE} \rrbracket = \lambda \mathcal{X}_{\langle i, t \rangle} \lambda t_i \left[\left((\exists t'' \neq \emptyset) [(\text{inf}(t) \prec \text{inf}(t'')) \wedge \mathcal{X}(t'')] \right) \vee \left(\forall t' [\neg \mathcal{X}(t')] \right) \right] \quad (\text{B0})$$

$$\llbracket \text{BEFORE } \mathcal{B} \rrbracket = \lambda t_i \left[\left((\exists t'' \neq \emptyset) [(\text{inf}(t) \prec \text{inf}(t'')) \wedge \mathcal{B}(t'')] \right) \vee \left(\forall t' [\neg \mathcal{B}(t')] \right) \right] \quad (\text{B1})$$

As a temporal property, [B1] can intersectively combine with \mathcal{A} to yield the truth conditions in [B2]:

$$\llbracket \mathcal{A} \text{ BEFORE } \mathcal{B} \rrbracket = \lambda t_i \left[\mathcal{A}(t) \wedge \left(\left((\exists t'' \neq \emptyset) [(\text{inf}(t) \prec \text{inf}(t'')) \wedge \mathcal{B}(t'')] \right) \vee \left(\forall t' [\neg \mathcal{B}(t')] \right) \right) \right] \quad (\text{B2})$$

Under the simplifying assumption that there is one PAST tense operator scoping above both clauses and denoting the underlined portion of [B2] by \mathcal{E} , the utterance time by t_{UT} , the contextually restricted relevant time interval by \mathcal{T}_c and the least upper bound of a set of \mathbb{R} by “sup” we obtain the truth conditions in [B3]:

$$\llbracket \text{PAST} \rrbracket \left(\llbracket \mathcal{A} \text{ BEFORE } \mathcal{B} \rrbracket \right) = \exists t \subset \mathcal{T}_c \left((t \neq \emptyset \wedge \text{sup}(t) \preceq t_{\text{UT}}) \wedge \mathcal{E} \right) \quad (\text{B3})$$

Informally, this approach, similar in spirit to [11], claims that a sentence $[\mathcal{A} \text{ BEFORE } \mathcal{B}]$ is true either if event \mathcal{B} occurs at a time after \mathcal{A} or if it is not instantiated at all in the contextually relevant interval.

4 The nature of the inferences

The default inference is the non-committal. More specifically, in out-of-the-blue contexts, i.e. in situations in which there is no discourse-specific information added to the **CONTEXT**, the exclusive disjunction does not allow resolution in favour of any of the two disjuncts. The factual and non-factual inferences arise as contextual entailments from the disjunction elimination rule [DE] below:

$$\frac{\mathcal{X} \vee \mathcal{Y} \quad \neg \mathcal{X}}{\mathcal{Y}} \vee E \quad (\text{DE})$$

The motivation for this is apparent. **BCs** are disjunctive propositions, so if the **CONTEXT** contains the negation to one of the disjuncts of a **BC**, the remaining disjunct will be the contextually entailed one. In particular, if the meaning of the **BC** is $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}$ and we can deduce $\neg \mathcal{B}$ (respectively $\neg \mathcal{A}$) from the set of premises containing the common ground and the main clause with its presuppositions and entailments, then by [DE], \mathcal{A} (respectively \mathcal{B}) can be concluded. In [7], Jordan dying has an entailment that he cannot be the agent of any action occurring after the time of death. This entailment together with disjunction elimination contextually entails the negative disjunct in the denotation of [\mathcal{A} BEFORE \mathcal{B}], namely that Jordan did not see his grandchildren.

In an analogous fashion, one derives the positive disjunct from contexts that favour it. Consider [12] below:

12. **Q:** When did John wash his car?

A: BEFORE he mowed his lawn.

If we assume that *wh*-adjunct questions carry an existential presupposition (following work such as [8] and [1] *inter multa alia*), then the expected answer to the question will be a time specification for the car-washing event. This presupposition of existence is the negation of the disjunct stating that “ $\forall t' [\neg \llbracket \mathcal{B}(t') \rrbracket]$ ”. Consequently, using $\vee E$ we can conclude that the other disjunct is true.

There is one additional, typological observation that seems to favor an account in which BEFORE is by default non-committal. In **MG**, the verb of the **BC** is in a dependent form, as mentioned in the introduction. More precisely, it is in PERFECTIVE NON-PAST, a form that as [7] argues, “contains a dependent time variable, i.e. a referentially deficient variable that cannot be identified with the utterance time of the context”. This restriction is only present for **BCs**, and does not surface with other temporal connectives. This referential deficiency of the PNP might serve as additional evidence for an ignorance-based account, such as the one I am advocating here.

5 The PNP verbal form

The PNP form of the verb is a weak NPI, per [5], as its presence is parasitic to that of a NONVERIDICAL environment. In particular, it is dependent on the

presence of a subclass of NONVERIDICAL environments: the future, the subjunctive, the conditional and the optative. NONVERIDICALITY, however, is merely a necessary condition for the licensing of the PNP. For example, NEGATION, a prototypical NONVERIDICAL operator does not license the PNP. This is because of selectional restrictions and additional semantic requirements of the PNP, thoroughly discussed in [7].

6 NPI-licensing

The denotation of BEFORE contains (exclusive) DISJUNCTION, a NONVERIDICAL operator, so adopting the theory of NPI-licensing of [5], which states that weak NPIs need to appear in NONVERIDICAL environments, we can see how examples like [3] are accounted for. Interestingly, exclusive disjunction does sanction weak NPIs in MG [13]:

13. I bíke **kanénas** sto spíti i afísame ta fota anixtá.
 or entered.3SG **anyone** at.the house or left.1PL the lights switched-on.PL
 ‘Either **someone or other** entered the house or we left the lights on.’

For the licensing of the strong NPI in [7], we posit a rescuing mechanism in the spirit of [6]’s rescuing mechanism for explaining the occurrence of *any* under ONLY. We posit that strong NPIs are sanctioned in the presence of strictly nonveridical operators (that is, nonveridical but not antiveridical) if a negative inference is contextually entailed.

I want to conclude the discussion about strong NPI-licensing in BCs by briefly mentioning the results of [16]. [16] investigate the time course of processing negation by studying how the NPI *ever* is processed in different types of negative environments. Their results show that negative information from both asserted and non-asserted content, i.e. explicit and implicit negation, is accessed equally rapidly in online processing. However, they find that explicit negation, namely negation that is present in the syntactic-semantic representation is applied immediately to license NPIs while implicit or pragmatically inferred negation is adopted at a later processing stage as a last-resort NPI-licensing mechanism, leading to additional pragmatic processing cost. This is a potentially welcome result for the STRONG RESCUING hypothesis as it might be the case that an analogous mechanism is at play for the licensing of strong NPIs in BCs. Further experimental work is necessary to validate this hypothesis and will be the focus of future work.

7 Conclusion

This paper has reconsidered two analyses of the semantics of BCs in light of two phenomena in MG BCs : licensing of strong NPIs and the anti-PAST restriction on the verb. I showed that [2] and [11] cannot be extended to MG

(at least without modifications) and that a new approach is necessary. The proposal in this paper proposes a disjunctive semantics for BEFORE that makes BCs non-committal by default and renders the factual and non-factual inferences contextual entailments. The disjunctive semantics makes BEFORE a NONVERIDICAL environment and explains the licensing of weak NPIs in BCs and the emergence of the PNP as the tense-aspect combination of the verb of BCs. The licensing of strong NPIs is achieved through a rescuing mechanism similar to that of [6].

This paper is a small addition to the important literature about temporal clauses in particular, and adjunct clauses more generally. It enriches the verbal typology as far as verbal forms appearing in adjunct clauses are concerned and it adds to the long-standing problem of the semantics of BEFORE by taking a crosslinguistic perspective. Finally, it adds to the vast literature on NPI-licensing by calling attention to another potential mode of NPI-licensing, a licensing of last resort similar to that introduced in [6].

References

1. Comorovski, I.: Interrogative Phrases and the Syntax-Semantics Interface, *Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol. 59. Springer Netherlands (February 1996)
2. Condoravdi, C.: NPI licensing in temporal clauses. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory* 28(4), 877–910 (November 2010)
3. Del Prete, F.: A non-uniform semantic analysis of the Italian temporal connectives *prima* and *dopo*. *Natural Language Semantics* 16(2), 157–203 (June 2008)
4. von Stechow, K.: NPI Licensing, Strawson Entailment, and Context Dependency. *Journal of Semantics* 16(2), 97–148 (1999)
5. Giannakidou, A.: Polarity Sensitivity as (Non)veridical Dependency, *Linguistik Aktuell*, vol. 23. John Benjamins Publishing Company (1998)
6. Giannakidou, A.: Only, emotive factive verbs, and the dual nature of polarity dependency. *Language* 82(3), 575–603 (September 2006)
7. Giannakidou, A.: The dependency of the subjunctive revisited: temporal semantics and polarity. *Lingua* 119(12), 1883–1908 (2009)
8. Karttunen, L., Peters, S.: What indirect questions conventionally implicate. In: Mufwene, S.S., Walker, C.A., Steever, S.B. (eds.) *Papers from the Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*. vol. 12, pp. 351–368. Chicago Linguistic Society (August 1976)
9. Kaufmann, S., Miyachi, M.: On the temporal interpretation of Japanese temporal clause. *Journal of East Asian Linguistics* 20(1), 33–76 (2011)
10. Kaufmann, S., Takubo, Y.: Non-veridical uses of Japanese expressions of temporal precedence. In: McGloin, N.H., Mori, J. (eds.) *Japanese/Korean Linguistics*. vol. 15. CSLI Publications (September 2007)
11. Krifka, M.: *Before* and *After* without coercion: comment on the paper by Cleo Condoravdi. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory* 28(4), 911–929 (November 2010)
12. Manfred Krifka: How to interpret “expletive” negation under *bevor* in German. In: Hanneforth, T., Fanselow, G. (eds.) *Language and Logos, studia grammatica*, vol. 72, pp. 214–236. Akademie Verlag (2010)
13. Maria Teresa Espinal: Expletive Negation, Negative Concord and Feature Checking. In: *Catalan Working Papers in Linguistics*, vol. 8, pp. 47–69. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (2000)

14. Sharvit, Y.: On the universal principles of tense embedding: the lesson from *before*. *Journal of Semantics* 31(2), 263 – 313 (April 2014)
15. von Stechow, A., Grønn, A.: Tense in adjuncts part 2: Temporal adverbial clauses. *Language and Linguistics Compass* 7(5), 311–327 (May 2013), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lnc3.12019>
16. Xiang, M., Grove, J., Giannakidou, A.: Semantic and pragmatic processes in the comprehension of negation. *Journal of Neurolinguistics* 38, 71–88 (2015)
17. Zwarts, F.: Nonveridical Contexts. *Linguistic Analysis* 25(3–4), 286–312 (1995)
18. Zwarts, F.: Three Types of Polarity. In: Hamm, F., Hinrichs, E. (eds.) *Plurality and Quantification, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol. 69, pp. 177–238. Kluwer Academic Publishers (1998)

A [11]'s BEFORE is ANTIADDITIVE

Theorem 1. *Let BEFORE be defined as in [11]. Then BEFORE is ANTIADDITIVE.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} be arguments of BEFORE and denote by $\llbracket \mathcal{X}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t}$ the expression $[t' \leq t \wedge \llbracket \mathcal{X}(t') \rrbracket]$. Recall, also, the following statements from propositional logic and set theory, where α denotes an arbitrary type:

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. $\neg(\exists x)[\mathcal{P}(x)] \equiv (\forall x)\neg[\mathcal{P}(x)]$ | (NE) |
| 2. $\lambda x_\alpha. (\mathcal{X} \vee \mathcal{Y}) \equiv \lambda x_\alpha. \mathcal{X} \vee \lambda x_\alpha. \mathcal{Y}$ | (PD) |
| 3. $\lambda x_\alpha. (\mathcal{X} \wedge \mathcal{Y}) \equiv \lambda x_\alpha. \mathcal{X} \wedge \lambda x_\alpha. \mathcal{Y}$ | (PC) |
| 4. $\mathcal{A} \wedge (\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{C}) \equiv (\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{B}) \vee (\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{C})$ | (STA) |
| 5. $(\forall x)[\mathcal{P}(x) \wedge \mathcal{R}(x)] \equiv (\forall x)[\mathcal{P}(x)] \wedge (\forall x)[\mathcal{R}(x)]$ | (QD) |

Then:

$\llbracket \text{BEFORE}(\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{C}) \rrbracket$	
$\equiv \lambda t. \left(\neg(\exists t') \llbracket (\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{C})(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right)$	(??)
$\equiv \lambda t. \left((\forall t') \neg \llbracket (\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{C})(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right)$	(NE)
$\equiv \lambda t. \left((\forall t') \neg \left[(t' \leq t) \wedge (\llbracket \mathcal{B}(t') \rrbracket \vee \llbracket \mathcal{C}(t') \rrbracket) \right] \right)$	(PD)
$\equiv \lambda t. \left((\forall t') \neg \left[\llbracket \mathcal{B}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \vee \llbracket \mathcal{C}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right] \right)$	(STA)
$\equiv \lambda t. \left((\forall t') \left[\neg \llbracket \mathcal{B}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right] \wedge \left[\neg \llbracket \mathcal{C}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right] \right)$	(de Morgan)
$\equiv \lambda t. \left[\left((\forall t') \neg \llbracket \mathcal{B}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right) \wedge \left((\forall t') \neg \llbracket \mathcal{C}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right) \right]$	(QD)
$\equiv \lambda t. \left[(\forall t') \neg \left(\llbracket \mathcal{B}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right) \right] \wedge \lambda t. \left[(\forall t') \neg \left(\llbracket \mathcal{C}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right) \right]$	(PC)
$\equiv \lambda t. \left[\neg(\exists t') \left(\llbracket \mathcal{B}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right) \right] \wedge \lambda t. \left[\neg(\exists t') \left(\llbracket \mathcal{C}(t') \rrbracket^{t' \leq t} \right) \right]$	(NE)
$\equiv \llbracket \text{BEFORE}(\mathcal{B}) \rrbracket \wedge \llbracket \text{BEFORE}(\mathcal{C}) \rrbracket$	(??)

\therefore BEFORE is anti-additive.